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1 Introduction
This article focuses on the impact of Asian Driver
dynamism on the financial sector. It discusses the
current and possible future implications of Asia’s
financial flows for the rest of the world. Specifically,
the article’s intent is to map the main types of financial
flows to and from Asia, to identify their financial
and macroeconomic implications for developing
countries, and to suggest possible areas of future
research. Much of the discussion will draw on recent
financial trends in China and India. China’s and
India’s rapid growth, size and increasing global
competitiveness make these two economies major
Asian Drivers, along with other countries and actors
in the region (Griffith-Jones 2004; IDS 2005). 
Section 2 provides an initial discussion of the
Asian flows we believe have been, or may become,
important for developing countries outside Asia.
Section 3 discusses the role of Asia’s official flows
in helping sustain the US current account deficit.
Section 4 examines foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows into and out of China, and specifically with
regards to outflows, and India’s flows as well. Section
5 discusses portfolio flows, and Section 6 offers
final considerations, in which global governance
issues are highlighted, and research approaches are
suggested.
2 The flows that matter
China has grown at around 8 per cent a year over
the past 20 years. India has grown at a slightly lower
rate (6.7 per cent) since the mid-1990s (World Bank
2004). In the case of China, this rapid and sustained
growth was accompanied by persistent and growing
current account surpluses. India also exhibited
surpluses in the current account during 2001–03,
but this has not been observed in 2004 (see Table 1).
It increasingly seems that China is playing the
role the US, the UK and a few other large European
economies did in the nineteenth century, of being
an engine of world growth due to its size and
dynamism, and as a capital exporter (Cheong and
Xiao 2003). However, the large Western economies
in the nineteenth century were fully open, and
therefore were mainly exporters of private capital.
In contrast, China still has only a partially open
capital account. As a consequence, the capital China
exports to the rest of the world is mainly through
the official sector. Another important difference
with the large Western economies of the nineteenth
century is that, although China exports capital, it
is a labour-abundant economy. These two attributes
have important financial implications for the rest
of the world.
First, China’s official sector has invested mainly
in US treasury bonds, which are considered safe
assets. Together with India and other Asian
economies that have accumulated foreign reserves
in sizeable amounts in recent years and invested
these reserves in US assets, China has contributed
to the financing of the US current account deficit,
which has been very large – over US$660bn or 5.6
per cent of the country’s gross domestic product
(GDP) in 2004 (Global Development Finance
2005). This has helped sustain US growth and
therefore global dynamism. However, there is no
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guarantee that this situation will continue in the
future. There has been growing concern at the risks
this poses for the world economy (Reisen et al. 2005;
Folkerts-Landau 2004; Griffith-Jones 2004).
Second, China has attracted a lot of foreign direct
investment (FDI) due to the fact the country provides
a large pool of cheap labour to its broader competitive
capacity. Among developing countries, it has been
the largest recipient of FDI.
1
At the same time, China
is starting to exhibit rapidly increasing outflows of
FDI, linked to its sourcing of commodities from
other developing countries. What opportunities
does that present for these countries, and how could
they maximise these opportunities? 
But the story is not confined to official and FDI
flows. Although China and India still have partially
restricted capital accounts, particularly for short-term
capital flows, gradual liberalisation has taken place
in the past few years, especially for portfolio equity
inflows in the case of China. This has led to an increase
in portfolio flows to these countries in recent years.
Tables 2 and 3 show that portfolio equity flows
to, and the issuing of bonds in, the international
capital markets by both China and India grew
strongly in 2003 and 2004, in both cases to levels
above those observed before the East Asian crisis.
Much of this recent increase reflects renewed interest
by international investors in developing country
assets as a whole.
The fact that China and India are increasingly
attracting portfolio flows poses a competitive
challenge for other emerging economies willing to
attract portfolio flows. But perhaps the biggest
impact on other developing countries will not occur
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Table 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators: China and India
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
*
China
GDP growth (annual %) 7.1 8.0 7.5 8.3 9.4 9.5
Current account surplus (US$bn) 21.1 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 47.3
Inward FDI (net, current US$bn) 38.8 38.4 44.2 49.3 53.5 56.0
FDI as proportion of GDP (%) 3.9 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.6
India
GDP growth (annual %) 7.1 3.9 5.2 4.6 8.4 6.8
Current account surplus (US$bn) –3.2 –4.3 0.2 5.8 8.0 -1.1
Inward FDI (net, current US$bn) 2.2 2.5 3.8 3.7 4.3 5.3
FDI as proportion of GDP (%) 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on World Development Indicators (2004); Global Development Finance
(World Bank 2005). 
*
Estimate.
Table 2: Net portfolio equity flows to China and India (US$bn)
1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China + India 5.9 8.3 2.9 9.4 3.8 3.3 15.9 18.0
China 1.9 5.7 0.6 6.9 0.8 2.2 7.7 10.5
India 4.0 2.6 2.3 2.5 3.0 1.1 8.2 7.5
As a proportion of net portfolio equity flows to developing countries (%)
China + India 18.0 36.7 22.8 75.8 63.3 56.9 64.0 67.2
India 12.2 11.5 18.1 20.2 50.0 19.0 33.0 28.0
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Global Development Finance (World Bank 2005: Statistical Appendix).
through diversion of flows towards China and India.
Instead, it may occur when these two countries take
the step of allowing residents to invest abroad on
a large scale. The liberalisation of portfolio outflows
is already under way in India, although at a slow
pace. Although full liberalisation is not likely to
take place in the near future, it nonetheless poses
important questions. Will major liberalisation for
private portfolio outflows have an impact on these
countries’ capacity to accumulate foreign reserves?
Will their capital surplus be mainly directed to
developed countries, or will developing countries
also be able to attract part of these flows? To what
sectors might these flows be directed?
A further important trend with implications for
developing countries concerns aid flows. Although
most of the world’s poor live in India and China,
India is starting to impose restrictive conditions on
the aid flows it receives from traditional donor
countries. Also, together with China it is starting
to donate aid to other developing countries. To the
extent that rapid growth continues, it is possible
that these countries become important players in
the aid system as net aid donors, and even in the
shaping of a new development aid architecture.
Will China’s and India’s aid be donated on
compassionate grounds, or will geo-economic
interests drive their aid policies? Will aid be mainly
directed to neighbouring countries? Will it follow
the geography of FDI outflows, as happened to
Japan in the past?
Some of these flows will have both competitive
and complementary effects on other developing
countries. For example, while China competes with
other developing countries for FDI, it is becoming
an increasingly important source of this type of
flows for this category of countries. But will this
trend continue? How important will these types of
flows be for other developing countries in the future?
Also, can China’s and India’s portfolio flows have
a complementary role as well? What is the likelihood
that this will happen? As regards official flows, how
harmful can Asia’s disengagement from US assets
be to other developing countries? What about
potential benefits? Can developing countries
appropriate the benefits of this disengagement in
the longer term, as the locus of new investment
opportunities? What countries could benefit –
mainly Asian developing countries, or countries
outside Asia as well?
3 The role of Asia’s official flows
in sustaining the US current
account deficit
2
One of the key aspects of the Asian dynamism is
the large trade surpluses many of the region’s
countries have been generating over the past years.
In most cases, the trade surpluses have resulted in
current account surpluses as well. In the context
of fixed or at least heavily managed exchange rate
regimes, the result has been that Asian governments
have accumulated large stocks of foreign exchange
reserves (see Figure 1). This has served the purpose
of insuring against instability in the international
financial markets, and avoiding undesirable
appreciation of their currencies, which could
undermine their international competitiveness.
As mentioned above, most of these reserves have
been invested in US assets, and have helped finance
its large and growing current account deficit. For
example, three-quarters of China’s US$600bn
foreign reserves have been invested in the US. This
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Table 3: Gross issuing of international bonds by China and India (US$bn)
1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
China + India 5.0 7.0 1.4 1.3 2.7 1.1 3.9 10.8
China 3.9 5.0 1.4 1.3 2.6 0.9 3.4 6.4
India 1.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.5 4.4
As a proportion of total developing country bond issuing (%)
China 5.5 5.5 2.1 1.9 4.0 1.5 3.9 5.8
India 1.5 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.6 4.0
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Global Development Finance (World Bank 2005: Statistical Appendix).
has helped sustained US growth, and has been good
to Asia, as it has provided a dynamic market for the
region’s exports. But there are already indications
that some Asian central banks are starting to reassess
their portfolio investment strategies. After all,
holding such amounts of reserves is becoming both
costly for many countries (these are quasi-fiscal
costs related to sterilisation operations) and risky,
in face of the prospect of capital losses associated
with the dollar devaluation and rise in the US
interest rates (Global Development Report 2005, Ch.
3). Indeed, a number of Asian governments have
announced they intend to reduce the percentage
of the reserve flows they invest in US assets. This
implies diversifying their portfolio gradually towards
assets in other currencies, such as the euro and the
pound, and even towards non-government assets
that had not been considered before among their
investment choices.
This new investment strategy by Asia’s central
banks may accelerate the decline in the dollar. The
major risk is not so much the decline in itself, seen
as necessary for the adjustment of the US economy,
but that it happens in a disorganised way. There is
a growing consensus that a coordinated strategy is
required to avoid a sharp dollar decline, requiring
inter alia a gradual adjustment of the US fiscal deficit,
efforts to stimulate growth in the euro area, and a
revaluation of the Chinese currency, within a broader
re-alignment of Asian currencies (which has already
started, but very timidly following China’s recent
adoption of a band system for its exchange rate).
What macroeconomic policy responses will too
rapid a decline in the dollar cause? A sharp increase
in the US interest rates? Could the latter also happen
independently of the behaviour of the dollar? What
will be the costs of a sharp increase in the US interest
rates for developing countries? What about the
broader effects, for example in the form of a sharp
slowdown of the US and thus the entire world
economy? What impact will that have on developing
countries? What will be the consequences for
developing countries of the increased macroeconomic
and financial volatility as a result of these adjustments?
We know developing countries are not a
homogeneous bloc. They hold different levels of
private debt, and have different financing needs,
institutional arrangements (e.g. insurance
mechanisms, social protection, exchange rate
regimes) and export structures. Thus, the impact
will be differentiated across the developing world.
Which countries will be most affected? What factors
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Figure 1: Foreign exchange reserves of selected Asian countries
Sources: Author’s elaboration based on Global Development Finance, 2005; BIS, 74th Annual Report, June,
2004.
will be the most harmful – the decline in the dollar,
the increase in interest rates, and for what countries?
Which sectors and population segments will be hit
hardest? By how much? Through what mechanisms?
4 FDI into and out of China
Table 1 shows that FDI to China was on the increase
between 1999 and 2004, although FDI as a
proportion of the country’s GDP looked fairly stable.
This proportion is not very high – it has been within
the range 3.5–4.0 per cent over the period but the
absolute FDI value at US$56bn for 2004 is
significant. In that year, it was equivalent to 34 per
cent of total FDI to all developing countries. Also,
it placed China as the largest recipient of FDI among
developing countries, far ahead other large recipients
such as Brazil, Mexico and Russia (see Table 4).
These figures should be tempered by the fact that
part of FDI to China is round-tripping Chinese
capital, that is, capital that leaves China unregistered
and officially re-enters the country as capital from
Hong Kong. 
As is well known, China’s position as a major
pole of attraction of FDI is not a recent
phenomenon. It has attracted this type of flows
since the early 1980s, following its open-door
policies initiated in the late 1970s. Table 5 shows
how much China’s FDI stock increased between
1980 and 2003, both in absolute terms and as a
proportion of the country’s GDP.
As can be seen from Table 5, China’s FDI stock
grew dramatically from around US$1bn in 1980
to US$500bn in 2003, or from 0.5 per cent to over
35 per cent of the country’s total GDP.
Most of the FDI to China has been directed to
the manufacturing sector; 66 per cent of the total
flows in 2001, thereby contributing to China
becoming a centre of regional and global production
networks, and a major export platform. Indeed,
multinational corporations (MNCs) in China are
responsible for more than half of China’s exports
(Cheong and Xiao 2003).
China’s position in regional and global
production networks implies that at the same time
it competes with other countries for third markets
(and to a lesser extent their own markets), it also
plays an important complementary role. The
patterns of origin of FDI to China indicate that this
is certainly the case at the regional level. During
the period 1995–2001, FDI from neighbouring
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Table 4: Net FDI flows to developing countries and largest recipients 1996–2004, annual
averages (US$bn)
*
1996–1998 1999–2001 2002 2003 2004
†
Developing countries 156.1 174.5 154.0 151.8 165.5
China 42.7 40.5 49.3 53.5 56.0
Brazil 20.9 28.0 16.6 10.1 15.3
Mexico 11.5 18.9 14.8 10.8 14.1
Russia 3.4 2.8 3.5 8.0 7.8
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Global Development Finance (World Bank 2005).
*
Current annual values are used to calculate the annual averages; 
†
estimate.
Table 5: FDI stock in China: selected years
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003
US$bn 1.1 6.1 20.7 134.9 348.4 448.0 501.5
*
GDP (%) 0.5 2.0 5.8 19.3 32.2 35.4 35.6
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Investment Development Report (UNCTAD 2004).
*
Estimate.
countries accounted for nearly 70 per cent of total
FDI flowing to China. It is true that the main FDI
source was Hong Kong, whose share in the total
was at 44 per cent, and that a significant portion of
this amount – 25 per cent according to the World
Investment Report 2003 (UNCTAD 2003) – is just
round-tripping Chinese capital. But Japan, Taiwan,
Singapore and Korea together also contributed to
nearly 25 per cent of FDI flows to China (Cheong
and Xiao 2003).
4.1 FDI outflows
China and India’s FDI outflows are a relatively new
phenomenon that, according to preliminary
indications, is growing in importance and that can
have far-reaching implications for other developing
countries. The questions to ask are: how much FDI
is flowing from China and India, and to which
countries and sectors? What is driving these flows?
What do these new trends imply for developing
countries?
Table 6 shows that China’s FDI outflows more
than quintupled from the 1980s to the 1990s, from
around US$450m annually to over US$2,846m
over the 1992–7 period. From 1999 onwards, these
flows started to oscillate. The accumulated flows
resulted in a FDI stock abroad totalling US$37bn
in 2003 against a stock of US$2.5bn in 1990 (see
Table 7).
As regards India, Tables 6 and 7 show that the
country’s FDI outflows also grew very rapidly, from
just US$96m in the 1992–7 period to nearly
US$1bn in 2003. The result was a FDI stock held
abroad of over US$5bn in 2003. 
China and India are not the main sources of FDI
among developing countries. China accounted for
only 5 per cent of total developing country outflows
during 2000–03, and for 4.3 per cent of the total
developing country FDI stock held abroad in 2003
(UNCTAD 2004). But the figures above also show
that these two countries are becoming increasingly
important FDI sources. Where are these flows going?
Mainly to developed or developing countries?
In the case of China, the largest recipients are
Hong Kong and the US. These two countries alone
accounted for over 50 per cent of the value of
approved FDI projects abroad in 2002. At the same
time, the following developing countries are listed
among the top 15 destinations of Chinese FDI
(measured by cumulative FDI value over the
1979–2002 period): Peru, Mexico, Zambia,
Cambodia, Brazil, South Africa and Vietnam.
Thus, although most flows are going to
developed countries, a number of developing
countries are also capturing some of these flows,
which in some cases are significant when measured
as a proportion of their GDPs. Moreover, the flows’
destination patterns seem to be changing very
rapidly. Between January and November 2004,
Latin America received 49.3 per cent of China’s
total outward investment, with 29 per cent of the
remaining flows going to Asia and 16.4 per cent to
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Table 6: China’s and India’s FDI outflows (US$m)
1980–9 1992–7 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China 450.0 2846.0 2634.0 1775.0 916.0 6884.0 2518.0 1800
India NA 96.0 47.0 80.0 509.0 1397.0 1107.0 913.0
Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNCTAD World Investment Report (2004).
Table 7: China’s and India’s FDI stock abroad (US$bn)
1990 1995 2000 2002 2003
China 2.5 15.8 25.8 35.2 37.0
India 0.1 0.3 1.9 4.0 5.1
Source: Author’s elaboration based on World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2004).
Europe (People’s Daily Online, 7 January 2005).
In the case of India, developing and emerging
countries figure more prominently in the country’s
list of FDI destination, accounting for nearly 70 per
cent of approved cumulative FDI values for the
1996–2003 period. The largest recipients have been
Russia, Mauritius, Sudan and Vietnam. If Russia is
excluded, over 50 per cent of the country’s FDI
have been directed to developing countries
(UNCTAD 2004).
4.2 What is driving China’s and India’s FDI
towards other developing countries?
In the case of China, the main factors are willingness
to acquire foreign technology, desire to establish
distribution networks abroad and to relocate mature
industries to countries with lower wages (UNCTAD
2004: 25–7). More recently, their need for natural
resources to sustain their high growth path has been
a key factor. 
Between 2000 and 2004, exports from Latin
America to China witnessed rapid growth. Brazil’s
exports to China grew by 400 per cent over the
period,
3
and Chile’s exports grew by 59 per cent in
2003 alone (ECLAC 2004). Latin America has
exported mainly mineral and agricultural
commodities. That makes the region a natural port
for China’s FDI. 
China has invested in the steel, iron, agriculture
and forestry in Brazil; and signed accords with
Venezuela to invest in the oil industry. China’s appetite
for raw materials from Latin America led it to aim
for large infrastructure investments in the region. It
reportedly promised US$50bn investment in roads,
ports and other infrastructure projects (Financial
Times, 9 March 2005). Much of the promised
investments are as yet largely unconfirmed, however.
In the case of India, the country’s companies and
firms’ aim for new markets, establishment of
distribution networks, foreign technologies and the
build-up of brand names seems to be the major
driving force behind its investment abroad
(UNCTAD 2004, Ch. 1: 27). The leading companies
and firms in this process have been those that provide
IT services, and those of the pharmaceutical industry.
As regards developing countries, India’s growing
needs for natural resources seems to be a major force
behind investments in this group of countries, as
its investment in Russia (which has been mainly in
oil) attests. India, which at present imports 70 per
cent of its oil needs and has an oil consumption per
capita of only one-third of the world’s average, faces
the critical challenge of expanding its foreign sources
of energy abroad, especially in view of its limited
domestic natural resources.
Given these recent trends, will China and India,
and developing Asia more broadly, become an
important source of FDI to developing countries?
What will be the beneficiary sectors – only natural
resource-intensive sectors? Will the poor be able
to benefit from these developments, or will they
remain outside any benefits, especially if most FDI
goes to resource-intensive industries? What room
will host governments have to pursue redistributive
policies? Will that be possible to be done through
fiscal channels, particularly in Latin America, where
they face high debt-service and thus budgetary
constraints? These are questions that future research
could aim to address.
5 Portfolio flows
As seen earlier, private portfolio flows to China and
India have increased in the recent past, as a result
of renewed interest by international investors in
emerging market assets and as a result of gradual
capital account liberalisation. As liberalisation
continues, and private capital outflows become
important, where will these flows go to? And what
about the official flows, currently invested in the
US and other developed countries?
Recently, a number of initiatives have taken place
in Asia to promote regional financial integration,
including among others the issuance of local
currency bonds by the Asian Development Bank
and other foreign issuers to promote financial
integration in Asia.
4
Park and Bea (2003) argue that
this will be good for the region. Greater regional
financial integration in Asia could lead to a regional
currency, which in turn could facilitate the creation
of a regional denominated securities market, thereby
reducing currency mismatch, a key issue facing
financial systems in developing countries. It could
furthermore contribute to the channelling of Asian
savings towards financing investment and growth
inside the region. Could these developments mean
a greater share of both official and private Asian
flows being invested inside Asia rather than outside
as is currently the case? How much of Asia’s capital
will stop going to the West, and be invested instead
in Asia? Will other developing countries be able to
tap these resources as well? What instruments and
mechanisms could these countries develop to have
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access to these flows? As regards the current
challenges facing the world, what will be the
implications for the resolution of today’s world
macroeconomic imbalances?
These developments could also have important
implications for Asia’s exchange rate regimes, their
investment priorities and, linked to that, their policy
choices of whether to target exports or domestic
demand as the main engine of growth. This, too,
could have far-reaching implications for the rest of
the world.
As regards Asian official flows, it is well known
that large reserves are becoming increasingly costly
for a number of Asian developing countries. Aiming
for lower levels of individual reserves, and having
in place a regional pooling of reserves, is seen by
many Asian analysts as a more cost-effective
arrangement. The Chiang Mai initiative, which has
been so far the main step towards a regional
arrangement, could be strengthened. Again, what
implications will that have for the world and for
developing countries outside Asia?
6 Final considerations
All the possible developments mentioned in this
article, as a result of continued dynamism of Asian
countries, particularly China and India, involve a
number of political economy issues that future
research could also aim to address.
For example, what will be the implications of
the unfolding of different scenarios for the
adjustment of the US macroeconomic imbalances,
for global governance? What will be the implications
of a successfully strengthened Chiang Mai initiative
for the power position of multilateral institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
relation to Asian countries? Specifically in relation
to China’s and India’s growing economic power,
will that be translated into efforts to have a greater
voice in multilateral institutions such as the IMF
and the World Bank? Will they build alliances with
other developing countries in a consistent fashion,
so that developing countries can pursue common
platforms in international fora, or will alliances be
forged on a case-by-case basis? Will the overall
results be net positive for other developing
countries? What strategies could these countries
build to maximise benefits (and minimise costs)
through allying with China and India? 
The issues and questions raised in this article will
have to be addressed through a number of disciplines
and methods, including both quantitative and
qualitative analyses. Research in this area will also
have to take into account the fact that the issues and
questions may vary significantly across regions and
countries (and even within countries). For example,
for different categories of countries, what flows will
be the most important? Will the competitive or
complementary effects dominate? What will be the
intensity of the impacts and how manageable will
these be? What arsenal of instruments and
mechanisms (individual, regional) will be available
to respond to shocks and changing circumstances
caused by the Asian Drivers? These questions imply
that regional and country-specific issues and
questions should be clearly identified to guide future
research and policy design.
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Notes
* This is a shortened version of a background paper
prepared for the Asian Drivers Workshop held on 9–10
May 2005 at the Institute of Development Studies. I would
like to thank the workshop participants for their
comments and Atsuo Mori for research assistance. The
usual caveats apply.
1. It should be remarked that part of this FDI is just round-
tripping Chinese capital.
2. For a thorough analysis of the US current account deficit
and the unfolding of alternative adjustment scenarios,
see Griffith-Jones (2004).
3. Figure from Brazil’s Ministry of Development, Industry
and Trade. But as Fleury and Fleury (in this IDS Bulletin)
show, Brazil has moved from a trade surplus to a trade
deficit with China in a very short period of time.
4. See Financial Times, ‘Asian bank will issue bonds in local
currencies to help markets’, by Victor Mallet, 15 April,
(2005); also Hoschka (2005).
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